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Abstract
 The magnitude 9.0 earthquake and tsunami that struck northeast Japan on March 11, 2011, were 
unavoidable natural disasters, but we consider the subsequent breakdown of the Fukushima nuclear 
power plants to be a catastrophe created by avoidable human errors – an organizational disaster. We 
review the mistakes that have led up to the present nuclear crisis, and recommend several steps to avoid 
similar crises in the future. These include issues of (i) determining whether the Fukushima catastrophe 
was an accident or a man-made disaster? (ii) irrational decision-making due to the pathology of Japanese 
organizations, (iii) the business ethics of power companies running 40+ years old ageing  nuclear reac-
tors, (iv) tired management and system fatigue that administrated the hidden trouble of old reactors as 
social responsibility, (v) dynamics of systems pathology caused by non-rational governance or multi-
system errors of disclosure for stricken area and overseas, (vi) un-homeostasis means the  pathology or 
apoptosis that is ‘Fukushima Formula’ applying to the nuclear reactor in the world.
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I.  Is the Fukushima Nuclear Catastrophe an Accident or a Man-made Disaster?
 The earthquake and tsunami that struck northeast Japan on March 11 of this year were natural 
disasters of unprecedented scale. More than 24,000 people lost their lives; about 100,000 people 
have evacuated the area; more than 250 billion dollars of damage was done; and it is expected that 
rebuilding the homes, businesses and infrastructure of a large section of Japan will take more than 
30 years. While most of the time, energy and money should now be devoted to reconstruction, there 
are fundamental questions with regard to the failure of the nuclear power plants that demand to be 
answered. The starting point of our research is the question: Was the yet-unresolved Fukushima 
nuclear power plant accident an unfortunate natural disaster or an avoidable organizational catastro-
phe? For the reasons explained below, we conclude that it was a man-made catastrophe (as defi ned 
by Thom, 1977). The origins of the Fukushima nuclear problem lie in system pathology.
II.  Irrational Decision-Making to Locate in a Quake-Prone and Tsunami Area
 The primary and fatal errors that led to the Fukushima disaster were made already in the late 
1960s and early 1970s when the construction of multiple nuclear power plants on the northeast 
shoreline of Japan was approved. It is of course well-known that earthquake tremors are frequently 
felt in nearly all corners of Japan, but the historical record is unambiguous in indicating that the 
Tohoku Region has experienced the most frequent and most severe earthquakes in Japan, and is a 
region where catastrophic tsunamis have wiped out coastal towns and villages within recorded 
history. Magnitude 7~8 earthquakes have frequently occurred in the Tohoku region and the largest 
earthquake in Japan occurred in the same region about 1000 years ago, the so-called Jogan earth-
quake. It is consequently beyond understanding that specifi cally the shoreline of the Tohoku area 
would be chosen as the location for nuclear facilities.
 As shown in Figure 1, the Fukushima nuclear power plants were set up in an area of highest 
earthquake probability in Japan. Furthermore, over the course of 40 years, there were fully 120 
disclosed problems at these power plants, and a still-uncertain number of undisclosed problems.
 The relative proximity of the Tohoku region to the industry-dense, power-hungry regions of 
metropolitan Tokyo was of course a prime factor in the selection of sites for power plants. The low 
cost of rural land, the likely economic benefi ts of building large facilities in the Tohoku region and 
the absence of an effective, populist opposition to the construction of nuclear power stations were 
also relevant factors. But, what the power companies and politicians could not provide on their own 
was a convincing argument concerning the safety of the facilities. For that reason, they needed to 
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solicit the advice of geologists and nuclear physicists for objective, disinterested, scholarly approval 
of the construction plans.
 In fact, there was an abundance of academics willing to approve the plans of the power compa-
nies for paltry sums. Some of the scholarly advisors have belatedly come forth with their apologies 
and “mea culpa” rationalizations, but the bottom-line is that they were rewarded for agreeing with 
the power companies that inordinate safety risks were not being taken in constructing those nuclear 
facilities – facilities essentially at sea-level in one of the most earthquake-prone and tsunami-prone 
regions in the world. One such advisor has recently confessed that his advisory fee over a period of 
years was 936,000 yen ($11,700 in US dollars) per month, regardless of the frequency of the actual 
meeting of the advisory committees (Aera, May, 2011). It is diffi cult to decide which is the greater 
crime: the continued operation of trouble-prone, ageing nuclear reactors by the power companies, the 
absence of independent government oversight of the power plants or the willingness of academic 
yes-men and lackeys to approve the construction and continued operation of power plants well 
beyond their period of trouble-free operation.
 The response of the Tokyo Electric Power Company and the government to the nuclear power 
Figure 1  On the left is shown the incidence of earthquakes in the Tohoku Region (from 2008.9 to 
2009.8). The number of earthquakes is shown below each location, followed by the 
number of earthquakes of seismic intensity more than 4. On the right is shown the number 
of operating (planned in parentheses) nuclear reactors, followed by the number of nuclear 
power plant troubles (source: Masai, 2009, p.93, p.105).
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plant disaster has clearly not been suffi cient. The disclosure of ambiguous, contradictory and incom-
plete information has only added to the fear and suffering of the victims. We have calculated the 
total milliSievert exposure over the fi rst 3000 hours since the tsunami. Figure 2 shows that the radial 
distance from a nuclear power plant is an unreliable measure of the danger zone. Outside the area of 
evacuation that the government has established, radiation doses much above normal have been 
recorded, for example, in Koriyama and Tenei. Notably, measurements at prefectural schools indicate 
that fi ve places exceed the provisional standard value that the government established – 3.8 micro-
sieverts – and there are many points where doses of radiation of 2‒3 micro-sieverts per hour have 
been detected. The Government decided on a provisional radiation standard for schoolyards of “20 
milli-Sieverts per year”. That standard was based on the ICRP’s recommendation for adults, but can 
it be applied to children, as well? A special advisor to the Cabinet’s nuclear engineering specialists 
noted the danger, and subsequently resigned. Nevertheless, the schools located outside the evacuation 
zone in Fukushima Prefecture continue to carry out classes as usual. Clearly, it is necessary to 
disclose information, not only for the needs of governmental administration, but also for the needs 
of residents in areas affected by natural disasters.
Figure 2  On the left is shown damage due to radiation exposure. On the right is shown the 
geographical distribution of radiation around Fukushima reactors since March 11.
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III.  Business Ethics; Operating the Ageing Nuclear Systems
 The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station includes 6 nuclear reactors, all of which are more 
than 30 years old (Table 1) and all of which were initially scheduled to be decommissioned at 30 ‒ 
40 years.
Table 1 Ageing of Nuclear Reactors in Japan (Source: Masai Y., 2009, p.93).⇒α
Nuclear Power Plant Name Period of Operation Latest Permission 
Tsuruga (West) reactor 1 41 years and 2 months ○
Mihama (East) reactor 1 40 years and 6 months ○
Fukushima Daiichi (East) reactor 1 40 years and 2 months ○
Mihama (West) reactor 2 38 years and 10 months ○
Shimane (West) reactor 1 36 years and 2 months ○
Fukushima Daiichi (East) reactor 2 36 years and 10 months ○
Takahama (West) reactor 1 36 years and 6 months ○
Genkai (West) reactor 1 35 years and 7 months ○
Takahama (West) reactor 2 35 years and 6 months ○
Fukushima Daiichi (East) reactor 3 35 years and 2 months ○
Mihama (West) reactor 3 34 years and 5 months ○
Igata (West) reactor 1 33 years and 8 months ○
Fukushima Daiichi (East) reactor 5 33 years and 1 month ○
Fukushima Daiichi (East) reactor 4 32 years and 7 months ○
Fukushima Daiichi (East) reactor 6 31 years and 7 months ○
 To begin with, the life of nuclear reactors is not specifi ed by law. Even if a nuclear reactor is 
found to be ageing, power companies can operate it semi-permanently, provided that it passes the 
maintenance inspection every decade. Specifi cally with regard to the Fukushima Daiichi power 
plant’s reactor No.1, the Nuclear Industry Safety Agency permitted its operation for more than 40 
years on February 7, 2011 (NISA, 2011, p.2). These nuclear reactors were not decommissioned in 
spite of 120 disclosed troubles and a still-uncertain number of undisclosed troubles (Masai, 2009, 
p.93).
 Table 2 shows the reported hazards from exposure to radiation, such as “cracks in the nuclear 
reactor” and “loosening of bolts.” (Nihon Kogyo Shinbun, 2003, p.14). The troubles were system-
atic, and the frequent inappropriate handling of the troubles and the complete absence of efforts to 
revamp the power plants from the ground up represent a lack of concern from the perspective of 
safety management. This has been the nature of the business ethics – or, rather, the lack of business 
ethics – exhibited by the Tokyo Electric Power Company over many decades. It is evident that 
Tokyo Electric Power Company’s management places more importance on economical growth than 
on social welfare (Bertalanffy, 1976, pp.47‒48).
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IV. Social Responsibility; Systemic Fatigue in Organizational Management
 ‘Shell melt-through’ generally means ‘melt down’. This occurred already about 1 hour 40 min-
utes following the earthquake due to a loss of back-up electric generation for the cooling operation. 
The possibility of this danger had already reported by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization 
in October, 2010 (JNES, 2010, p.(4)‒7). Although the nuclear policy explicitly states that “even if 
the probability is low, it is necessary to take steps to remedy possible dangers,” measures were not 
taken. According to the report of the Nuclear Industrial Safety Agency (NISA, 2010, p.1), serious 
violations of nuclear waste management in nuclear reactors No.1, No.3 and No.5 of the Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station were pointed out. Moreover, one level 2 violation was pointed out 
with regard to nuclear waste management, but the troubles were concealed and records falsifi ed by 
both the Tokyo Electric Power Company and General Electric.
 In Figure 3, the fi lled-in black triangles show the concealed events prior to 2002. Tokyo Electric 
Power Company did not announce these events in spite of the fact that troubles were experienced at 
all of their reactors. For example, they found cracks in the 'shroud' which is the cylindrical stainless 
Table 2  The Number of Technical Problems at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. The 
pink regions indicate the repeated “inappropriate handling” of serious problems, specifi cally, 
the concealment of cracks in the shroud (source: Nihon Kogyo Shinbun, 2003, p.14).
Systems Pathology of Social Organizations  7
Figure 3 
C
oncealm
ent of troubles and falsifi cation in the records by TEPC
O
 and G
E. (source: G
enshiryoku siryoushitu, Iw
anam
i N
o.582, 2002, p.7.)
Statically, the blue shade is the safety zone of nuclear reactors – generally suggesting that the trouble-free period is som
ew
hat less than 
20 years.
関西大学総合情報学部紀要「情報研究」第35号8 2011年8月
steel cover that surrounds the reactor core, but did not report the actual number of cracks. In addi-
tion, from the number of occurrences of trouble, it is evident that nuclear reactors No.3, No.4, and 
No.5 operate with more stability than No.1 or No.2. As of 1986, 15 years had elapsed since reactor 
No.1 began operations. In Reactor No.3, the fi rst trouble occurred 20 years from the beginning of 
operations. No.4 and No.5 experienced troubles after 14 years. In light of these experiences with 
Reactors 1‒5, it can be said that the period of stable operation for these nuclear reactors is about 15
‒20 years. Unfortunately, if the life of a nuclear power plant is limited to just 20 years, the total 
cost of nuclear power generation is high, because maintenance and decommissioning will entail a 
huge expenditure. For this reason, many Japanese Electric Power Companies are in un-competitive 
situations, and, as a result, the companies are necessarily motivated not to make timely decisions 
about decommissioning even when circumstances indicate the reality of technical problems.
 In light of the current Fukushima disaster, we believe that Japan should take on the mission of 
establishing new safety guidelines for the operation of nuclear reactors. Specifi cally, we suggest the 
following decommissioning standard of nuclear reactors. This decommission formula is based on 
Fukushima nuclear disaster (ε≒α×β×γ×(ρ+τ)). Three variables of function are used in the formula: 
reactor’s age, trouble level, and earthquake level.
‘Fukushima Formula’ of Stopping the Nuclear Reactor for the Local People
ε ≒ α × β × γ × (ρ + τ)
ε: decommissioning index of the nuclear reactor
α: age of nuclear reactor (years)
β: trouble level
 (level 0: 1.5, level 1: 2.0, level 2: 2.5, level 3: 3.0 over level 4: level)
γ: maximum magnitude of earthquake
 (M5.0: 1.5,  M6.0: 2.0,  M7.0: 2.5,  M8.0: 3.0,  M9.0: 3.0)
ρ: un-safety management level of organization (ρ + τ≧ 1)
 (Compliance the Law, Corporate Social Responsibility, Business Ethics, industrial pollution)
τ:  ambiguity of nuclear policy related the local and globalization
The possibility of ‘Fukushima Formula’ is adjusting the different condition in the world.
(where an ε value greater than 100 would result in decommissioning)
 For example, applying Fukushima Daiichi No.1 plant to this standard, the operational term of 
reactor is 40 years, the trouble level is 2, and the maximum magnitude is M8, giving a decommis-
sioning factors. Fukushima Formula: ε≒40×2.5×3.0, so ε > 100.
 The organizational problems that have plagued the Fukushima nuclear facilities are of three 
kinds: the construction and later proliferation of nuclear plants in an area where earthquakes and 
tsunamis are known to occur, frequent troubles because of the ageing of plants designed to last for a 
standard of 30 years, and fi nally troubles due to the attempted concealment of events related to acci-
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dents and ageing. Including these, there were also problems in safety management. In short, the 
functioning of “checks and balances” by administrative supervision has not worked well, and we 
must conclude that the Japanese system for nuclear power plant management has inherent organiza-
tional problems with regard to the decommissioning nuclear reactors.
V.  Dynamics of System Pathology; Socio-biological Hazards
 The following Figure and Table show a comparison between the Fukushima and Chernobyl 
disasters. On April 12, 2011, the Fukushima nuclear disaster was raised to INES level 7, the same 
as Chernobyl nuclear disaster.
Figure 4 Radiation area of Chernobyl and Fukushima
Table 3 A Comparison of the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster and the Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster
(source: IRSN, May 23, 2011, p.28)
Fukushima Chernobyl
Victims Dead: unknownRadioactive exposure: unknown
Dead: 4,000‒16,000
Radioactive exposure: over 830,000
Radioactive 
contamination 
zone
Contamination level Local people Contamination level Local people
Evacuation zone 
20 km
85,000
(628 km2)
Initialize evacuation
zone 30 km
135,000
(2,830 km2)
> 300,000 Bq/m2
(>10 mSv per year)
69,400
(874 km2)
> 555,000 Bq/m2
(>7 mSv per year)
270,000
(103.000 km2)
> 150,000 Bq/m2
(> 5 mSv per year)
292,000
(1,241 km2)
> 185,000 Bq/m2
(> 2.4 mSv per year)
1,300,000
(19,000 km2)
Radiological 
release
3/11~precent
spread by air and ocean current
4/26~5/6
spread by air
Restoration Over 30 years Over 30 years (100 years?)
INES level 7 7
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 In the Fukushima case, the supervisory authorities of nuclear power generation in Japan are a 
double administrative structure. One is a Cabinet Offi ce (Japan Atomic Energy Commission and 
Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan) and the other is the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(Nuclear Industrial Safety Agency). The reality of multiple supervisory committees makes it unclear 
where responsibilities lie. Moreover, the practice of former government offi cials fi nding employment 
in the private sector is a widespread problem. Five persons who acted as supervisory authorities later 
became directors of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (The Mainichi Daily News, April 15, 2011). 
Clearly, the social function of overseeing the safety of the nuclear power industry has declined and 
there is a strong possibility that the friendly relations between the supervisory authorities and the 
industry have had deleterious effects on their watchdog role.
biological 
factors 
social 
factors 
physical 
factors 
tsunami earthquake 
man-made 
system error 
irrational 
decision 
making  
Social
failure of 
safety  
management 
Physical Biological 
ageing 
reactors 
public 
administration
catastrophe natural 
disaster 
Figure 5 Radioactive Hazards (after Reason, 1997)
 These are problems of social responsibility and the dangers of failing to maintain a distinction 
between public and private sector functions. These aspects indicate the need for ‘systems thinking’ 
and ‘systems pathology’ (Troncale, 2011). For instance, Barnard (1938) has emphasized the complex 
interactions among biological, physical, and social factors. In that light, the Fukushima nuclear 
catastrophe is clearly an example of the pathology of organizational systems with multiple causes 
and effects. The deleterious effects of such pathology can perhaps be minimized by working within 
the conceptual framework of systems theory.
 ‘Systems thinking’ can be used to forecast problems arising in other areas in Japan and overseas. 
The problem of ageing reactors is extremely serious not only in the Tohoku region of Japan, but 
also with regard to the 13 reactors located in western Japan. This area is called “Genpatsu Ginza”, 
where nearly all of the reactors are ageing systems. For example, the Tsuruga reactor is more than 
41 years old and the Mihama reactor is more than 40 years old. Furthermore, many troubles have 
been disclosed about these reactors. And what is worse, they are located near three geological 
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troughs: the Nankai trough, the Tokai trough and the Tonankai trough. If those troughs synchronized, 
a massive earthquake would occur, as has in fact taken place every 200 years in Japan.
13 reactors
-Tsuruga (41 years)
-Mihama (40 years)
-Takahama (36 years)
-Ooi (32 years)
Three Earthquakes
synchronize
NankaiTrough
Suruga Trough
Figure 6 The three troughs forecasting in Western Japan
Table 4 A Comparison of Nuclear Systems Worldwide (source: JAIF 2011)
In operation Under construction In planning Average age
Japan 54 4 11 24
China 13 30 23 26
India 19 8 4 18
Russia 28 11 13 27
USA 104 1 8 30
France 58 1 0 24
 From a global perspective, it is also important that new international standards be applied to the 
nuclear power stations currently under construction or planning in the developing world, notably, 
China and India. Table 4 shows the current state of developments in six of the major nuclear power 
generating countries. Prior to the recent disaster, Japan operated 54 nuclear reactors, but three quar-
ters have now been stopped. Although it was once said that the level of Japanese nuclear technology 
was the highest in the world, pervasive problems in management and policy have become evident. 
In order to avoid repetition of the Fukushima disaster or worse disasters (Chroust, 2011) in the 
developing world, the enforcement of fi rm, quantitative standards by independent regulatory agencies 
will be required.
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VI.  Un-Homeostasis; Pathology or Apoptosis?
 The Fukushima nuclear power station has continued to operate in spite of signs of ageing and, 
indeed, until the recent disaster, three new reactors had been scheduled to be built in the same loca-
tion without fi rst decommissioning the old reactors. The damage of this accident has not been 
confi ned solely to the local populace’s exposure to radiation; there has also been signifi cant damage 
to international relations. Various foreign countries have expressed misgivings about the spread of 
radioactive substances within Japan and their possible spread overseas. Two months following the 
natural disaster, the damage has continued to enlarge both economically and socially to the entire 
country. Moreover, the international community has clearly lost confi dence in Japan’s ability to 
respond effectively to domestic problems. On the basis of the Fukushima example, local people can 
judge the risk of nuclear reactors in operation.
 Figure 7 shows the world magnitude of plate-type earthquakes. We focus on magnitude near 9.0 
since 2000. These big earthquakes form the pacifi c boundary that is ‘Plate’s Dogleg’. We adapt to 
the Fukushima’s decommissioning formula toward the world earthquake map. Figure 8 shows the 
results when the index is applied to nuclear reactors worldwide. Green marks show safe nuclear 
power plants, orange marks show plants of unknown safety, and red marks show dangerous plants.
Figure 7 ‘Plate’s Dogreg’ area is Magnitude 5.0 or Greater Earthquakes.
(Source: http://www.bousai.go.jp /hakusho/h22/bousai2010/html/zu/zu002.htm).
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 Insuffi cient disclosure of information to the residents in the affected area has also become a 
problem. Although the scale of this earthquake was beyond expectations, many problems have arisen 
in response to the natural disaster and the extreme vulnerability of countermeasures to the catastro-
phe was exposed. We recommend that, in the near future, organizations should shift from policy that 
gives priority to economic profi ts to policy where safety management and long-term sustainability 
becomes paramount. Nuclear power generation holds a dominant position relative to other means of 
generating electricity – hydropower, thermal power, wind power, solar power, geothermal power, 
tidal power – but the dominance is based on the presumption that nuclear reactors have a longevity 
of at least 40 years. Actually, the cost of constructing nuclear reactors is necessarily high, so that the 
fi rst 20 years of operation is essentially a period of regaining the initial investment. If, however, the 
stable lifetime of nuclear reactors is only 20 years, as suggested by the Japanese history of nuclear 
power generation, then nuclear technology becomes uncompetitive in comparison with other power 
generation technologies.
Figure 8 Dangerous Rating of World Nuclear Reactors by ‘Fukushima Formula’.
fatigue of policy 
General Systems 
(L. v. Bertalanffy) 
social limitations 
biological limitations 
physical limitations 
socio-cultural 
biological 
physical-chemical 
symbolic 
Social Organization 
 (C. I. Barnard) 
ageing reactor 
system 
(technology) 
failure management 
Figure 9  The Multiple Levels of Factors that must be considered in a System’s 
Approach to the Governance of Nuclear Power Stations.
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 Finally, it is worth repeating the fundamental idea that initiated the revolution in “general 
systems theory” some decades ago (Wiener, 1961; Bertallanfy, 1976; Maturana & Varela, 1980). The 
desirability and viability of nuclear power plants cannot be evaluated without consideration of the 
social systems in which they are imbedded. The supply-and-demand decisions for economic growth 
are a necessary part of any social policy, but the wider effects on humanity must also be included. 
Realistic estimates of the sustainability of the “whole system” require a “systems” perspective.
Z: environmental costs 
(restoration for the radioactive damage of ecosystem - including the human society in environment) 
Stakeholders: Recovery of radiation area with local people’s health, agriculture and marine pollution. 
X: consumption 
Y: generating costs 
S: electric power supply 
D: electric power demand 
St: sustainability curve: 
  Nuclear disaster’s stakeholder 
Figure 10 3D-Utility of Power Generation
 In light of the Japanese experience, it can be said that decision-making based solely on supply-
and-demand was the cause of system pathology. The economic viability of the large-scale nuclear 
fi ssion power plants that were designed prior to developments in systems theory – and, indeed, prior 
to the development of modern computers – is questionable. When the economy of nuclear power 
generation is discussed, the problem of radiation poisoning should not be excluded. For example, the 
construction cost of a new shelter of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant is 1.6 billion euro, and the 
maintenance costs are additional. Ukraine cannot pay these costs. Nuclear power generation is not 
economical and not a sustainable technology if we consider the radiological processing costs and 
environmental stress. To summarize, the following are organizational problems that could have been 
avoided. Firstly, the nuclear power plant was constructed in an area where many earthquakes and 
several tsunamis have occurred. Secondly, there has been a signifi cant number of nuclear power 
plant troubles due to ageing and, moreover, systematic concealment of those problems. Thirdly, there 
has been a long-term deterioration of organizational systems, like the safety management of Tokyo 
Electric Power Company and problems of the administrative supervisory role. At the very least, in 
the future the Japanese Government and the Tokyo Electric Power Company should disclose accu-
rate information to facilitate local recovery, such that the disclosure of information can be trusted 
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and there is greater faith in the power companies and in the government. This will also help to 
reduce damage caused by rumours by overseas media.
 Consideration of the dangers of nuclear power must be made from a global perspective. We 
recommend not only stopping the Hamaoka nuclear station but also undertaking independent check-
ing of the 54 reactors in Japan. At the recent G‒8 summit meeting held in Deauville, France, on 
May 26, Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan requested to the IAEA, that a new safety standard for 
nuclear plants be established for quake-prone countries. Properly speaking, however, Japan should 
make this standard and suggest it to the world. The ongoing Fukushima nuclear disaster has its 
origins in a failure to think in terms of “whole systems”. With only the short-term goals of fi nancial 
gain and social consensus under consideration, unacceptable risks have been taken in the Japanese 
nuclear power industry, ultimately leading to large-scale problems for the Japanese population.
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